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This paper provides a survey of the positive functions of the nuclear
arms race for segments of society and society as a whole. The analysis
of the positive functions does not serve as a justification for the status
quo, but is undertaken to point out the numerous constraints mitigating
against change. Massive social forces operate in such a manner as to
continue and expand the arms race, indicating large scale social changes
are required to stop it. A series of policy alternatives are enumerated
as functional alternatives which would have fewer negative conse-
quences while preserving our national security.
A report card on the current state of Americans' well-being
would be an ambivalent one. It would contain some indicators
of economic success, such as greater numbers of very affluent
families and more people working than ever before. But it would
also contain many indicators of economic failure, such as con-
tinued high rates of poverty and the relatively low wages asso-
ciated with most new jobs. Under the "social" heading, passing
grades would appear for "sense of national pride" and "plays
well with allies" (except for occasional streaks of bullying), but
failing grades would have to be given for the categories of "helps
others in need" and "diplomatically resolves tension without re-
sort to violence." A complete explanation for such a mixed re-
view would necessarily entail a multidimensional analysis of
economic, social, political and cultural phenomena that would
cover an entire volume (or more). The purpose of this article is
to examine only one part of this complex reality-the impact of
the continued nuclear arms race on American society. It will do
so by presenting a structural-functional analysis of the nuclear
arms race as a means of suggesting policy alternatives to it.
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The arms race is driven by a policy of extended nuclear de-
terrence. This policy is based on maintaining a weapons capa-
bility to fight and prevail at all levels of violence, from
conventional battles to extended nuclear exchanges. Since both
sides must presume worst-case scenarios, technological ad-
vances or build-ups on either side necessitate a response from
the other side. Furthermore, the untestable nature of deterrence
theory-that we can never be sure what level of threatened de-
struction will deter the enemy-does not enable establishing a
maximum size of our arsenal (Marullo, 1985). As a result, the
military requirements for extended deterrence dictate a contin-
uous arms race.1
The military machinery needed to sustain an extended de-
terrence policy is enormous and presents a large strain on the
U.S. (and the Soviet) economic and political systems. During the
past seven years there has been widespread criticism of U.S.
nuclear warfighting preparations necessitated by our strategic
policy: citizen participation in the antinuclear weapons move-
ment has reached unprecedented levels; grassroots peace and
nuclear weapons freeze groups have sprung up in even the
smallest, most conservative communities; the U.S. Roman Cath-
olic Bishops and dozens of other national church bodies have
questioned the morality of deterrence and have called for a halt
to further nuclear weapons build-ups; and for the first time in
U.S. history, Pentagon plans for a new major weapon system
have been seriously curtailed by the Congress. 2 In the Soviet
Union and the Eastern bloc nations, the unofficial or dissident
peace movement has challenged the Communist Party's peace
propaganda by organizing mass rallies in defiance of govern-
ment orders and by being critical of the Soviet Union's role in
the arms race. 3 We should not, however, allow this outpouring
of public sentiment against the arms race to obscure the role
nuclear weapons play in shaping and maintaining institutional
and interpersonal relations in our society. The purpose of this
article is to survey the consequences of our reliance on a policy
of extended nuclear deterrence with respect to the economy, the
political system, individual and interpersonal relations, and cul-
ture. The analysis proceeds by briefly surveying the status quo
maintaining functions of the nuclear warfighting preparations
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dictated by our policy of extended deterrence. We then turn to
the consideration of a set of alternative policies which are func-
tionally equivalent but less dysfunctional than our current pol-
icies. Before proceeding with the analysis, however, it is
necessary to describe the major components of our deterrence
policy and its implementation.
Current Deterrence Policy and Its Implementation
Current U.S. nuclear weapons policy is best described as
one of extended deterrence. Its purpose is to deter a Soviet (or
other aggressor's) attack on the United States, our allies, and our
strategic interests. This is acccomplished by configuring our ar-
senal in such a manner as to: preserve an assured retaliatory
capability (minimally), respond successfully to a wide range of
an enemy's offensive thrusts, and assure that the U.S. can utilize
force at any level of the escalation ladder in order to attain vic-
tory. Extended deterrence also calls for the ability to prevail in
a nuclear war, which means having options at any point during
an extended nuclear exchange to force the Soviet Union to cease
hostilities on terms favorable to the United States. Former Sec-
retary of Defense Weinberger summarized this strategy as
follows:
should deterrence fail, then our strategy is to restore peace on
favorable terms at the lowest level of conflict as soon as possible ...
we seek a flexible force structure that builds on our alliance com-
mitments and forward deployments and provides us a variety of
options for quickly responding to unforseen contingencies in any
region where we have vital interests to defend (U.S. Senate, 1983,
pp. 10, 24).
The material and technological requisites for implementing
an extended deterrence policy are met through a multi-step proc-
ess leading to nuclear weapons being put in place ready for use
against an enemy. This process includes pure and applied sci-
entific research and development, testing of new or improved
weapons, the production processes related to manufacturing the
weapons, and the eventual deployment of the weapons. The
strategic component of nuclear warfighting preparations refers
to the development and implementation of plans that guide the
construction and configuration of our arsenal in such a way as
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to best accomplish the intended objectives. Obviously this proc-
ess beginning with pure research and leading to deployment
does not occur in a vacuum. These objectives are determined
through a political process largely dominated by an "iron pen-
tagon" of elites in segments of government, military, university,
research, and industrial bureaucracies (Adams, 1981; Melman,
1974; Mills, 1956). Nuclear warfighting preparations are thus
best conceived as a set of broad enterprises that operate to de-
termine which political objectives (beyond deterring an attack
through an assured retaliatory capability) can be accomplished
through the use of nuclear weapons, how they can be best ac-
complished, and the implementation of those decisions through
the development and deployment of appropriate weapons
systems.
Since 1979, our nuclear arsenal has been undergoing a "mod-
ernization" process through which each leg of the nuclear triad
is upgraded. The land-based leg is being enhanced by the ad-
dition of highly accurate MX missiles, with a mobile "midget-
man" missile under development. The sea-based leg has been
modernized by the addition of more sophisticated Trident sub-
marines, the deployment of sea-launched cruise missiles, and
the development of the Trident 2 D5 SLBM. The air-based leg
has been upgraded by the deployment of air-launched cruise
missiles on modernized B-52 bombers, the addition of the B-1B
bomber, and the development of the "Stealth" bomber. Research
and development of the Strategic Defense Initiative to enhance
deterrence has grown into a multi-billion dollar enterprise. For-
ward basing of intermediate range nuclear weapons (GLCMs
and Pershing 2s in Europe) took place before the weapons were
dismantled under the recent INF agreement between the United
States and Soviet Union. And numerous "enhancements" to our
warfighting capabilities have been undertaken, such as improv-
ing command, control and communication facilities, and hard-
ening missile silos. Overall, roughly $1.9 trillion has been spent
for national defense from 1982-1988, of which $429 billion was
spent for nuclear war preparations (Center for Defense Infor-
mation, 1987, pp. 2-3).
Obviously, such an enterprise with its attendant costs are
likely to redound throughout the entire society. Twelve functions
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of the operation of these broad enterprises are enumerated be-
low. I have divided them into four categories for ease of pres-
entation purposes, but they dearly overlap and are interconnected
with each other. A set of alternatives is outlined in the conclu-
sion. The functions of our extended deterrence policy are ex-
amined in the realm of the economy, the political system, social
psychology, and culture. 4
Functions of the Arms Race for Society
Economic Functions
Nuclear warfighting preparations are carried out through a
cooperative venture by the government and the private sector.
Not surprisingly, the hundreds of billions of dollars of defense
spending during the past four decades has had an enormous
impact on the composition of the work force and the types of
goods and services produced. 5 Spending for nuclear warfighting
preparations has also had the effect of: stabilizing and strength-
ening particular industries and corporations, providing a means
of upward mobility for indiviiduals within the "iron pentagon,"
and reinforcing our political economy by maintaining the value
of consumer goods.
Function 1. Nuclear warfighting preparations create thousands
of jobs for strategic analysts, engineers, lawyers, contractors, tech-
nicians, military personnel, weapons assemblers, Defense Depart-
ment officials, etc. The Department of Labor estimates that for
$1 billion of Defense Department procurement, an average of
26,000 jobs are created (Anderson, 1982). In addition, many sup-
port or auxiliary jobs are created as well, such as civil defense
planners and administrators, university research support staff,
and public relations and advertising positions to promote new
weapons and maintain a favorable public image.
Of course, this type of government spending is one of the
least cost-effective methods of producing jobs. Government pro-
grams for virtually any other purpose, such as education, health,
environmental regulation, etc., produce more jobs, and more
less-specialized jobs, than nuclear weapons modernization out-
lays. In fact, even allowing taxpayers to retain the equivalent
amount of money to such expenditures through lowering their
tax burden would create more jobs simply by increasing demand
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for consumer products (Anderson, 1982). Nevertheless, substan-
tial numbers of jobs are directly dependent on the arms race,
and it is primarily among those whose votes are 
taken quite
seriously by elected officials. Slowing or halting the arms 
race
will require a significant relocation of human labor. Planning 
for
such changes and providing services for those whose lives have
been dislocated or disrupted must be an essential component
of any alternative policy.
Function 2. Some products originally created for nuclear war-
fighting purposes have been utilized in the civilian economy, par-
tially benefitting all consumers. The U.S. government provides
billions of dollars for military research and development. 6 Some
of the technology developed for use in electronic guidance sys-
tems, computer microcircuitry, laser applications, telecommun-
ications and satellite networks, and other areas has been put to
use in commerical products or otherwise serves the public good.
Perhaps, in the not-too-distant future, solar energy technology,
currently used for powering military satellites and remote sta-
tions, will become commercially available for use in home space
and water heating.7
Function 3. Military contracting practices have stabilized dozens
of large corporations that otherwise might have gone out of business,
creating massive economic disruptions, financial hardship for stock-
holders, and job loss for thousands of workers. Several major cor-
porations receive the bulk of their revenues from government
military contracts, depending on them for their survival.
8 One
of the criteria the Pentagon explicitly considers when awarding
contracts is stability of the corporation; for firms that are one of
but a few suppliers of a certain product, its financial instability
may actually improve the chances of being awarded a contract.
This has served not only to protect the investors and employees
in these corporations, but since many of these corporations also
produce other goods, it also benefits the consumer. Among the
larger corporations whose stability has been enhanced by de-
fense contracts in the recent past are Boeing, General Electric,
Lockheed, Westinghouse, and General Motors.
Function 4. The steady increase in nuclear warfighting prepa-
rations has functioned as a source of upward mobility for thousands
of individuals working in weapons production and military indus-
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tries. Many careers have advanced entirely on the basis of the
development of a particular weapon. The early retirement pro-
visions for career military men, manifestly an inducement to-
ward a military career, allow for lengthy careers in the private
sector after retiring from the military. Often, these civilian po-
sitions are in the weapons industries in which the officer has
worked, so the industry benefits from the retired officer's
expertise.
The careers of many engineers, technicians, analysts, etc. in
the private sector benefit from their work on particular weapons
systems. Although funding varies from one year to the next, and
weapons undergo design changes or become obsolete, there is
relatively high job stability and above average compensation for
defense related specialists (Melman, 1974). In sum, the steady
growth of our nation's capacity to wage nuclear war has been
good for the careers of the individuals who work in the "iron
pentagon."
Function 5. The allocation of massive amounts of our nation's
wealth to nuclear warfighting preparations contributes to a perpet-
ual shortage of consumer goods. Nuclear weapons are obviously
a non-consumable portion of our G.N.P. At first glance this may
appear to be a negative consequence, but it does have the pos-
itive effect of making the remainder of the goods and services
produced more valuable. Massive disruptions may occur if, in-
stead of stockpiling nuclear weapons, the marketplace were sud-
denly flooded with billions of dollars worth of additional
consumer goods, making them available to more households
through lowered prices. The individual's work ethic may be se-
verely challenged, potentially undermining a necessary com-
ponent of our political economy.
Political Functions
Social scientists have long been aware of the positive func-
tions of conflict for social life. In particular, Simmel (1955) and
Coser (1956) theorized on the consensus building and unifying
consequences that conflict has for a group, i.e. in-group differ-
ences are minimized or suppressed and animosities are di-
rected at the external enemy. Nuclear warfighting preparations
operate in a similar manner, without the actual conflict, provid-
Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare
ing a source of internal unity expressed through our disdain for
the Russians (or more generally, communism). In addition, our
political system has benefitted from the experience and leader-
ship of individuals who were originally trained in warfighting.
Finally, in the international realm, U.S. opinion and policy have
great influence on global-decision making which is partially
supported through our primacy in nudear capabilities.
Function 6. Domestic political cohesion on foreign policy matters
is enhanced by agreement on nuclear warfighting preparations felt
to be necessary against the Soviet Union. The two major political
parties differ in their response to the Soviet threat only in the
fervor with which they articulate anti-communist policies. This
bipartisan unity is a source of stability for foreign policy, which
then reinforcces public opinion disdain for the Russians. Ac-
cording to opinion polls, fear and mistrust of the Russians are
among the most strongly held convictions of our political creed
(Ladd, 1982; Smith, 1983; Yankelovich and Doble, 1984). Our
increased nuclear warfighting preparedness is believed to be a
response to an increased Soviet threat. The collective sacrifice
required to respond to the threat confirms our fears, but simul-
taneously reinforces this bedrock belief.
This unanimity is derived from the public's limited and con-
trolled knowledge of the Soviet Union. There is little discussion
or debate over what U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union should
be, and that which emerges is largely dominated by the elites
within the "iron pentagon" (Adams, 1982; Tobias, 1983). There
is very little independent information with which to either verify
or repudiate official statements, which by default become truth. 9
The lack of knowledge, elite control of public debate, and the
unchallengeable assertions of the "iron pentagon" promote pub-
lic fear of the Russians, leading to increased military prepara-
tions with which to confront them, which then further reinforce
public consensus on the Soviet threat. The point here is not to
question whether the Soviets are not to be trusted, but that the
unanimity and strength of this belief is a source of foreign policy
stability and bipartisanship. 10
A dosely related function of this widely shared definition of
the Soviet threat is its utility as a domestic social control mech-
anism. The federal government reserves for itself the sole au-
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thority to classify the secrecy of warfighting related information.
This authority is used to minimize dissent by withholding in-
formation that would challenge the publicly shared definition of
the Soviet threat. Individuals who disagree with official defi-
nitions are thus deviants by the mere fact of their disagree-
ment-or at the very least they can be discredited as "harmless
dupes" of the enemy. Thus boundary maintenance and social
control functions are enhanced by warfighting preparations and
its attendant secrecy.
Function 7. The leadership and expertise of individuals trained
in and responsible for nuclear warfighting preparations have con-
tributed to their effective fulfillment of other important positions
within the political system. Many military officers and other gov-
ernment officials who were previously responsible for nuclear
warfighting preparations have left those positions, but have used
the knowledge they acquired to try to help change, improve, or
otherwise serve in our political system. To name but a few of
these individuals and cite the diversity of their present activities,
we should look to: former General Alexander Haig, who served
as Secretary of State; Henry Kissinger, former National Security
Advisor and Secretary of State, now a private citizen and former
head of a Presidential Commission to resolve conflict in Central
America; Daniel Ellsberg, former analyst for Pentagon strategic
nuclear war plans, now an ardent peace and disarmament activ-
ist; and Robert McNamara, former Secretary of Defense, and
current advocate for a bilateral nuclear weapons freeze, no-first-
use pledge, and a campaign against world hunger."
Function 8. In the international realm, our political/diplomatic
status is enhanced by our primacy in nuclear warfighting capabili-
ties. One of the explicit functions of our nuclear warfighting
capabilities is to use it as a threat or form of blackmail when
dealing with other countries. 12 On a somewhat less explicit level
our nudear arsenal is the "big stick" that can be used to facilitate
our diplomatic efforts in dealings with our allies as well as our
enemies.
Social Psychological
Nuclear warfighting preparations have several positive con-
sequences for our emotional well-being and collective psyche.
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First and foremost, our warfighting preparations help make us
feel good about ourselves, our national strength and determi-
nation. However, the tasks of planning and preparing to actually
fight a nuclear war are potentially disturbing ones. The division
of labor in our society and the existence of a specially trained
elite to handle these problems allows the rest of us to not have
to worry or think about these preparations.
Function 9. Our preeminence among nations in nuclear war-
fighting capabilities serves as a source of national pride. We feel a
collective strength and confidence that comes from being Num-
ber One in military power. Public displays of our military
strength-air shows, parades, media coverage of military exer-
cises-not only make us feel good about ourselves, but encour-
age us to continue our efforts. There is thus an interaction among
the large cost of preparing for nuclear war, the individual sac-
rifices required to pay these costs (especially taxes), and the
sense of reward, pride, and unity that results from sacrificing
for this noble cause. This feedback is necessary to enable the
next round of preparations to continue.
Nuclear warfighting preparations can be seen as a sort of
contemporary, hi-tech potlatch ritual. 13 Nuclear weapons are not
made to be used, but rather to sit in their launchers until they
become obsolete and are replaced with more sophisticated
weapons. The old weapons are literally dismantled, and the new
ones are, in essence, waiting for the same fate. The weapons can
be seen as a gift from the taxpayer to the military, which, with
our approval, ultimately destroys them (Thompson, 1982). In
return, however, we receive the sense of security, satisfaction
and reward which derive from being able to afford to have our
wealth sit in the ground and never have to be used.
Function 10. The manner in which we prepare for fighting a
nuclear war enables the vast majority to not have to worry about
it. Our affluence allows us, through a highly specialized division
of labor, to maintain an elite which plans and prepares for a
nuclear war. Obviously, nuclear war is horrible to ponder, but
the existence of a competent and well-trained group to whom
we have delegated this responsibility allows us to carry out our
daily routines without overwhelming despair. Lifton labels this
phenomenon "psychic numbing" (Lifton and Falk, 1982, p. 101)
but we should not overlook its utility for enabling the remainder
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of society to continue to be productive, to enable it to generate
the surplus necessary to sustain our nuclear capabilities (Canjar,
1985).
Cultural
Two different levels of culture are discussed here as having
benefitted from nuclear warfighting preparations: science and
popular culture.
Function 11. The growth and acceptance of the role of science
and technology in our society has been both directly and indirectly
facilitated by our nuclear warfighting efforts. In a direct manner,
billions of dollars in government funds have been allocated to
the enterprise of science for the purposes of pure and applied
research aimed at improving nuclear weapons technology. In an
indirect manner government support of the growth of science
and the incorporation of its products for non-military purposes
has increased the public's acceptance of science and its reliance
on technological solutions to many diverse problems. Science as
an institution now enjoys one of the highest ratings on public
trust among the major institutions, and scientists rank near the
top of occupational prestige ratings.
Function 12. Nuclear warfighting language and scenarios have
enriched our popular culture. Motion pictures and television mov-
ies "entertain" us in their depiction of nuclear holocaust and its
aftermath (e.g. "War Games," "On the Beach," "Testament," and
"The Day After"); novels on world war three or life thereafter
have reached the bestseller lists (Warday; Alas, Babylon); video
games in which nuclear wars are fought and board games of
war and the struggle for survival fill our leisure time; poets,
artists and musicians incorporate nuclear imagery into their
work; and the fashion industry markets military fatigues and
survivalist fashions in a multi-million dollar industry. Finally,
our language has become enriched by such phrases as: "it's
about as easy as nuclear war" (an extremely difficult task in-
deed), and "nuke 'em 'til they glow."
Conclusion: Implications and Functional Alternatives
The fact that some segments in our society benefit from nu-
dear warfighting preparations should now be obvious. Clearly,
weapons contractors, scientists, and military officials are di-
Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare
rectly rewarded for their efforts in nuclear warfighting prepa-
rations. But other groups indirectly benefit as well, for example:
international diplomats, processors of important natural re-
sources, civil defense planners, and segments of the telecom-
munication, fashion, and entertainment industries. In addition,
several consequences benefit society as a whole rather than par-
ticular groups, through such processes as: encouraging the de-
velopment of science, promoting social cohesion, and assuring
our access to natural resources.
However, the functional analysis presented here also makes
obvious many of the negative consequences of our policy of
extended deterrence. Some segments of the population are di-
rectly adversely affected by these efforts, whereas other conse-
quences have a more general negative impact on the whole of
society. Rather than belaboring the negative consequences of our
nuclear warfighting preparations, I would now like to turn to a
set of functional alternatives-alternatives which preserve many
of the positive consequences while mitigating the negative ef-
fects. These alternatives, which are presented here in a neces-
sarily brief form, are discussed within the four major categories
used above.
Functional Equivalents
The manifest functions of our policy of extended deterrence
are the protection of the United States as a sovereign state and
the preservation of our democratic form of government. On a
secondary level, extended deterrence serves to sustain our cur-
rent lifestyles, contain communism, define a global order com-
patible with our domestic needs, and secure our supplies of
natural resources.
Over the past two decades, however, the challenge of main-
taining our definition of a global order, backed by the use of
force and ultimately our policy of extended deterrence, has be-
come increasingly difficult and may well be beyond our capa-
bilities in many circumstances (Sanders, 1984; Wolf, 1984). The
tensions in U.S.-Soviet relations is a condition conducive to es-
calating hostilities between the superpowers. The technological
advances in the arms race by themselves give us less and less
time to evaluate data to determine if our forces are being at-
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tacked by increasingly accurate weapons, making the hair-trig-
ger ever more taut. Increased global militarization has increased
the number of arenas (and the intensity of conflict in them)
which could escalate into early use of tactical nuclear weapons.
These factors, taken together, indicate new levels of danger which
call for immediate shifts in strategic nuclear policy and our overall
foreign policy.
The broad outlines of such a strategic and foreign policy
should include:
1. Moving away from extended deterrence toward a policy of min-
imal nuclear deterrence, which would include, among other
things, replacing the more vulnerable, multiple warhead land
based missiles with more survivable submarine based missiles,
and multilateraly reducing our strategic stockpiles by retiring
the most vulnerable weapons;
2. Immediately withdrawing forward based tactical nuclear weap-
ons and dedaring a policy of no early first use. This should be
followed by multilateral reductions of conventional forces in
Central Europe and a no first use declaration at the completion
of such reductions;
3. Halting technological advances in nuclear weapons by agreeing
to multilateral proposals to cease missile flight testing, warhead
testing, ASAT testing, and all weapons testing in space;
4. Asserting political initiative to reaffirm and then strengthen all
existing arms control treaties;
5. Removing U.S. conventional forces based all over the globe ex-
cept from where they are essential to protect vital security in-
terests. This includes cooperating with the European NATO
allies to allow them greater definition of and responsibility for
their defense needs;
6. Supporting social science research and development in the areas
of: crisis intervention, mediation, and negotiation; studies on
the perception of deterrence; and critical explorations of the in-
ternational conditions necessary for avoiding war and creating
a stable peace; and establishing mechanisms for testing and
implementing the results of this work; and
7. Replacing military aid with development aid for less developed
countries and easing their debt repayment burdens. This would
lower the likelihood of intra- and international conflict in third
world countries which could escalate into superpower interven-
tion and conflict.
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The United States could make unilateral initiatives, especially in
areas one, three, five and six, which would not adversely affect
national security, but which could provide the basis for further
incremental reductions. 14 Accompanying these changes would
be U.S. domestic policies that discourage reliance on foreign
resources and provide incentives for increased energy self-suf-
ficiency (Barnet, 1981; Lovins, 1977).
Economic
The impact of our preparations for nuclear warfighting on
the economy is obvious, as partially evidenced by functions one,
two, three, and five. The policy of extended deterrence leads to
an open-ended arms race that is projectd to consume an increas-
ingly larger portion of our tax dollars. Moving toward a policy
of minimal deterrence will demand fewer resources of our econ-
omy and allow for more growth in nonmilitary sectors. How-
ever, the influence of the military industrial complex must also
be curtailed and replaced by a more consciously considered
economic program. We should acknowledge the piecemeal and
uneven cooperation between the public and private sector, and
admit consumer and labor representatives into the process as
partners. The economic reconstruction program should consider
explicitly labor, development, corporate, consumption and con-
version objectives.
1. Labor: A program of job creation in the areas of infrastructure
repair and (re)construction, mass transit, railroads, and energy
construction; and education programs to provide individuals
with talents and skills needed for a changing economy. This can
be done through the tax structure, providing incentives to cor-
porations to increase the number of jobs it creates and employee
education or retraining programs it operates, while reducing
tax benefits to corporations who relocate or destroy jobs without
adequately preparing and compensating workers who are no
longer needed.
2. Development: An increase in government supported, nonmili-
tary research and development, including guaranteed invest-
ments where appropriate, in the following areas: eradication of
health problems such as high infant mortality, cancer, AIDS,
and heart disease; energy conservation; environmental protec-
tion and dean-up; more efficient mass transportation systems;
and renewable energy resources.
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3. Corporate: The explicit institutionalization of a federal planning
body, answerable to Congress, that guarantees consumer and
labor prominence in its composition. This body will set guide-
lines and priorities for a federal corporate bank, which will en-
courage or subsidize particular kinds of investments it deems
socially desirable.
4. Consumption: Assure that each person has a minimally suffi-
cient bundle of the following essential goods and services: food,
shelter, clothing, health care and education. This can be accom-
plished with minimal market intervention by the federal gov-
ernment through an income tax restructuring; through a
combination of a nonmarket system of allocating a minimal
bundle of essentials with a market system for the remainder; or
by a combination of expanding current programs and altering
our tax structure to exempt these essentials from taxation.
5. Conversion: Some of the current military industry will no longer
be required, but the workers in defense facilities and the com-
munities in which they are located should not be abandoned.
A planning body of labor, management and community rep-
resentatives should explore alternative uses for no-longer-needed
defense facilities, with the objective of producing socially useful
products. Federal legislation can mandate the formation of al-
ternative use committees at each contract site, and provide eco-
nomic support for the process by earmarking a portion of the
funds from canceled military contracts. 1 5
Political
Political unity in the United States is based on the submis-
sion of individual desires and cultural diversity to a set of higher
principles, such as liberty, freedom, and respect for others' rights.
There is not only no need for solidarity through xenophobia,
but this hysteria in fact undermines our civil rights, individuals'
control of government, and our mutual respect for diversity. We
should recommit ourselves to these ideals through our basic in-
stitutions of the family, schools, and church. Each of these can,
in turn, benefit from increased (no strings attached) support
from the federal government, through such policies as: increased
funding for all forms of child care arrangements and larger tax
credits for child care costs; assuring adequate pay for all labor-
ers, especially females and minorities, in the work force; in-
creased support of public education at all levels; and preventing
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political interference in the operation of our religious institutions
by strengthening the wall of separation between church and
state. Once the artificial inducements for work within the "iron
pentagon" are removed, the "best and brightest" will turn to
serving their country in other capacities.
Social Psychological
The source of our collective pride need not be our ability to
destroy, but should instead reside in our ideals and principles,
and the methods we use to implement them. We should be able
to "walk tall" in the knowledge that we have promoted liberty,
democracy and self-sufficiency through means that are consis-
tent with their ends, rather than through the use of force. At
home, individuals will have a greater sense of pride and accom-
plishment in their ability to participate in the political system
and control their government. Less noble, but perhaps more
important for long term human survival, is the need to roll back
the growing "life-boat ethic" and replace it with a social soli-
darity ethic (Reich, 1985). Rather than viewing the rest of the'
world's "have-nots" as being out to take our resources, we must
begin to see our mutual interdependencies and appreciate that
our own survival and lifestyle depends on the well being of
others. Rather than adopting a fearful "bunker mentality," our
psychological well-being will be enhanced by improvements in
the quality of life of others.
Cultural
On the cultural level, there are innumerable alternatives to
nudear war based entertainment. The film, music, and video-
game industries will turn to other sources of inspiration when
the threat of nuclear war no longer has a mass public appeal.
We have already begun to see the effects of improved commu-
nications with the Soviet Union resulting from U.S.-U.S.S.R.
city-twinning projects; cultural, educational and scientific ex-
changes; collaborative documentaries and television specials;
and other "citizen diplomacy" initiatives.
The enterprise of science also has innumerable options avail-
able to it, and is well-enough established to pursue them should
the "iron pentagon" no longer require its services. Health, en-
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ergy, communications, computer applications, conservation, ge-
netic engineering, transportation and agriculture are but a few
industries that could benefit from an influx of highly capable
scientists and government funded basic and applied research.
The functional alternatives to nuclear warfighting prepara-
tions are obviously only briefly mentioned here; each is in itself
worthy of volumes of discussion. The more detailed discussion
of the functions of nuclear warfighting preparations is not in-
tended as a rationale for the status quo. Rather, its purpose has
been to demonstrate the complex interconnections of military
buildups to the rest of our society and to point out the large
number of vested interests outside of the "iron pentagon" in
addition to the more obvious ones within. Many social forces
in addition to belligerent leaders are responsible for the escala-
tion of the arms race. We must change these too if we hope to
alter our present course.
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Footnotes
1. This implies that limits to the arms race have to be external, which could
take one of two forms. The first is that technological changes can be
proscribed and ceilings placed on all types of weapons, which is the goal
some seek to achieve through arms control. The second is that as the
resources required to maintain technological and infrastructural de-
mands grow at an increasing rate, the military burden becomes larger
than the political system can bear.
2. The MX missile funding was cut and stretched out in the FY 1983 and
FY 1984 budgets, and the FY 1985 defense appropriation set conditions
for delaying and halting funding altogether. In a compromise, the
Administration agreed to reduced levels of funding and a cap on the
number of missiles (100) for FY 1985. Further cuts, stretch-outs, and a
lower cap (50) were set in the FY 1986 budget authorization. The FY 1987
budget further stretched the timeline for producing and deploying the
fifty missiles. Technical problems with the guidance system and contin-
uing Congressional skepticism regarding the utility of the MX make it
highly unlikely that more than 50 missiles will ever be deployed.
3. For descriptions of the Eastern bloc dissident peace movement, see Gor-
don (1984), and Rubenstein (1983). Of course, the dissident groups' op-
erations are greatly restricted in the Eastern bloc and in the U.S.S.R., but
in conjunction with Gorbachev's arms control initiatives, increasing peace
rhetoric, and recent glasnost efforts, the seeds for real reform may be
beginning to germinate there.
4. Several caveats regarding my use of a functional analysis are in order
before proceeding. 1) I would like to make it clear that I am not neces-
sarily making claims of causality between the warfighting preparations
and the function being described-sometimes the association is a spu-
rious one, sometimes causal, and sometimes mutually causal. It is clear
from the context which claim is being asserted. 2) It should be under-
stood that the term positive function is not an evaluative term connoting
goodness. 3) As with all functional analyses, the groups or segments
which enjoy the positive benefits are either obvious or explicitly specified.
5. Globally, roughly $9,000 billion was spent between 1960 and 1981 for all
military expenditures (Sivard, 1982:6). The United States spent roughly
$1,700 billion on weapons procurement, construction, research, devel-
opment and testing during this interval (U. S. Senate, 1983:11). Using a
very conservative estimate of 15% of the total being dedicated to nuclear
weapons (a standard defense department estimate), this implies $255
billion for nuclear weapons investment between 1960 and 1981.
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6. In FY 1984, the amount authorized for military R & D was approximately
$30 billion (U. S. Senate, 1983:3), and over the previous decade, 1974-83,
the total was $177.6 billion (U. S. Bureau of the Census, 1983:593). In
contrast, the federal government provided only $1.3 billion in FY 1984 to
the National Science Foundation, and $7.8 billion during the 1974-83
decade (U. S. Bureau of the Census, 1983:595).
7. It should be fairly obvious that the spinoffs from nuclear warfighting
weapons have been relatively few and disproportionately expensive. This
is due to the secrecy requirements of military research and the atypical
requirements necessitated by military objectives. High technology con-
sumer products could be produced much more cost-efficiently through
directed civilian applied research programs. For a fuller discussion, see
Reppy (1985). Because the dysfunctional consequences for each of the
remaining ten functions are fairly obvious, they will not be considered
explicitly here.
8. In his study of the eight largest defense contractors, Adams (1981) finds
that during 1970-79, defense department and NASA contracts accounted
for an average of 50% of their total sales. This ranged from a low of 31%
for Boeing to a high of 82% for Grumman (Adams, 1981:34). Aldridge
(1983:Ch. 11) presents data demonstrating that Lockheed's corporate
profitability and survival depend on defense contracts.
9. Nor can there be any firm, independent data, because a major part of
our fear rests on Soviet leaders' motives or intentions, which are not
observable. The manner in which these unverifiable assertions over Soviet
intentions are used to serve the interests of the hard-liners within the
"iron pentagon" is examined in Sanders (1983) and Wolf (1984).
10. This undoubtedly works in an identical manner within the Soviet Union-
fear and mistrust of the United States become a source of social cohesion
and a political rallying point. Needless to say, the effects are probably
even stronger there, due to their significantly more restricted sources of
information.
11. The list could obviously be extended indefinitely, but for some of the
more prominent and interesting career paths, the reader could follow
those of: Hans Bethe, Frank Carlucci, Eugene Carroll, Noel Gaylor, Dan-
iel Graham, T. K. Jones, Gene LaRocque, John Lehman, Roger Molander,
Richard Perle, Hyman Rickover, Eugene Rostow, and Edward Teller.
12. Blechman and Kaplan (1978) and Ellsberg (1981) enumerate several epi-
sodes when nuclear threats were brandished in order to achieve desired
outcomes.
13. Potlatch refers to the Kwakiutl American Indian ritual in which hosts
would give their guests some of their material possessions to throw into
a fire, thereby destroying them. This would be a demonstration of the
host's strength or wealth-that he could afford to have his guests destroy
it.
14. The Soviet Union's unilateral warhead test moratorium from August,
1985, through February, 1987, is an example of such an initiative, as is
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the continuing U. S. ASAT test moratorium imposed by congressional
funding cutoffs. Unfortunately, the political will to carry these initiatives
further has proved to be insufficient. The recent INF agreement also could
have served to increase momentum for more drastic strategic reductions
(e.g. 50% cuts), but here too it is the political reluctance to take the next
step that has blocked further progress.
15. For more in-depth discussions of the economic proposals mentioned here,
as well as other alternatives, see: Barnet (1981), Bluestone and Harrison
(1982), Gordon and McFadden (1984), Harrington (1982), Melman (1980),
Mische and Mische (1977), U. S. Congress (1982), Zwerdling (1980).

